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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 17-2410
_____________
JOSEPH JUGAN; ROBIN JUGAN,
Appellants
v.
ECONOMY PREMIER ASSURANCE COMPANY
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 5-15-cv-4272 )
District Judge: Hon. Jeffrey L. Schmehl
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 12, 2018
Before: JORDAN, KRAUSE, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Filed: March 22, 2018)
_______________
OPINION
_______________



This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7,
does not constitute binding precedent.

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Joseph and Robin Jugan appeal from the grant of summary judgment against them
on their claim that Economy Premier Assurance Company (“MetLife”)1 breached an
insurance contract. We will affirm.
I.

Background2
The Jugans own a home in Fleetwood, Pennsylvania, which they insured under a

homeowners insurance policy (the “Policy”) issued by MetLife. “Coverage A” in the
Policy said that MetLife would “pay for sudden and accidental direct physical loss or
damage to the property …, except as excluded in SECTION I – LOSSES WE DO NOT
COVER.” (J.A. at 139.) Section I, in turn, excluded from any coverage losses or damage
resulting directly or indirectly from “freezing of a plumbing, heating, air conditioning, or
automatic fire protective sprinkler system, or of a domestic appliance, or by discharge,
leakage or overflow from within the system or appliance caused by freezing.” (J.A. at
141.) That “Absolute Freezing Exclusion” stated that it did “not apply if you have used
reasonable care to maintain heat in the building or if you shut off the water supply and
drained the plumbing and appliance of water.” (J.A. at 141.)
Sometime between February 1, 2015, and March 13, 2015, while the Jugans were
away, water leaked from their dishwasher, causing damage to their home and its contents.

Economy Premier Assurance Company’s parent company is MetLife, Inc.
Because the parties and the District Court refer to the Defendant as MetLife, we do
likewise.
1

2

The facts set forth here are in the light most favorable to the Jugans. See infra

note 4.
2

Mr. Jugan contacted MetLife the day after he discovered the water damage to report the
loss and to file a claim for coverage under the Policy. MetLife hired an expert, a certified
engineer, to investigate the loss. He did so and issued a report stating that the water
damage was due to a frozen dishwasher solenoid valve that fractured due to freezing in
the water supply line to the dishwasher. He further concluded that the water froze
because of insufficient heat within the home, which he “attributed to the thermostat for
the hot water baseboard heat [having been] set too low[.]” (J.A. at 274.) His research led
him to report that the outside temperatures in the area during the relevant timeframe were
“adequate to cause piping system freezes.” (J.A. at 275.) And he concluded that hot
water continuously leaked from the broken dishwasher solenoid valve after the water in
the supply line thawed, which caused the fuel-fired boiler that provided hot water for the
first-floor heating system to fail after the fuel oil tank ran dry.3 The Jugans offered no
evidence rebutting those expert conclusions.
The Jugans’ home included a main floor and a walkout basement. The dishwasher
was in the kitchen on the main floor, and the water supply lines to the dishwasher ran
along the basement ceiling, below the kitchen floor. The main floor was heated using a
forced hot air system, and its temperature was controlled by a digital thermostat. The
basement was heated using two hot water baseboard radiators, and the temperature was
controlled by an analog thermostat. Neither basement radiator was located below the
kitchen. The Jugans had the home’s heating system serviced during the summer of 2014,
3

Hot water from the fuel-fired boiler was used both to service the hot water
baseboards in the basement and to heat the air that flowed to the main floor through a
forced air system.
3

at which time the radiators in the basement were replaced. Mr. Jugan stated that he
wanted to be present when the new radiators were turned on so that he could test them for
leaks. But he never did test the new radiators, and he testified that there was no way to
know whether they worked at all before the water damage occurred.
Since 2009, the Jugans had frequently left the home empty, sometimes for weeks
at a time. Mrs. Jugan moved to Massachusetts in 2009 and did not live in the
Pennsylvania home after that time. In October 2014, Mr. Jugan’s mother became
terminally ill and Mr. Jugan began to spend most of his time with her in New Jersey. He
did not set the thermostat at any particular temperature when he left the house in October
2014. After Mr. Jugan’s mother passed away on January 1, 2015, he continued to spend
most of his time away from the home until March 13, 2015. His last time at the home
before the dishwasher leak was February 1, 2015, when he was present for only one or
two hours. He did not remember much about that visit because he was “very much in
withdrawal” from medication he had been on that caused his recollection to be “kind of a
haze.” (J.A. at 145.) Mr. Jugan suffers from a brain tumor that requires him to take
prescription narcotics. The tumor and the medications have led to forgetfulness,
including a failure to recall events. He did not remember adjusting the digital thermostat
on the main floor, and he could not definitively state whether the thermostat was set at
62°F before he left. He also did not remember adjusting the analog thermostat in the
basement, and he could not remember the temperature it was set at when he left that day.
But Mr. Jugan testified that he kept a thermometer on an interior wall of the basement,
and that it generally read 54°F year round.
4

Mr. Jugan watched weather reports for the Fleetwood, Pennsylvania, area between
February 1 and March 13. He saw that the weather was cold and snowy. In fact,
MetLife’s expert reported that the low temperature in nearby Reading, Pennsylvania, was
between -1°F and 8°F on at least six days in mid-February.
Mr. Jugan testified that neighbors had access to the Jugans’ home, and he had
sometimes asked them to check on the house while he was away. He did not, however,
ask his neighbors to check on the home between February 1 and March 13.
The Jugans sued MetLife for breaching the Policy after MetLife denied coverage.
MetLife moved for summary judgment on that claim. When it did so, Mr. Jugan filed an
affidavit containing averments that he said raised genuine issues of material fact barring
summary judgment. The District Court applied the sham affidavit doctrine, striking
certain averments that contradicted Mr. Jugan’s earlier testimony without sufficient
explanation, while crediting other averments that did not contradict other evidence in the
record. The Court rejected Mr. Jugan’s averment that, when he “traveled away from his
house during the winter of 2014-2015[,] he set the thermostat on the main level of his
house at 62 degrees Fahrenheit and set the thermostat in the basement at its low setting.”
(J.A. at 14.) The District Court said that statement contradicted Mr. Jugan’s earlier
testimony that he could not definitively state whether the thermostat on the main floor
was set at 62°F. But the Court credited Mr. Jugan’s averments that it was his habit to
leave the thermostat on the main level set to 62°F, that “the heat in the main level of the
house was turned on and the house felt warm,” or “approximately 62 degrees
Fahrenheit,” when he left on February 1, that it was his habit to leave the basement
5

thermostat turned on and set to its low setting of 40°F, and that the Jugans had used the
same basement heat setting in the past without experiencing freezing problems despite
similarly cold outside temperatures. (J.A. at 16.)
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of MetLife with respect to
the Jugans’ claim under Coverage A of the Policy, after deciding that no reasonable jury
could find that the Jugans had used reasonable care to maintain heat in their home. The
Jugans timely appealed.
II.

Discussion4
We agree with the District Court’s thorough analysis and conclusion that the

Jugans cannot recover under the Policy. Pennsylvania law provides that “[t]he
interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law.” Kvaerner Metals Div. of
Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins., 908 A.2d 888, 897 (Pa. 2006). The
“primary goal in interpreting a policy” is to determine “the parties’ intentions as
manifested by the policy’s terms.” Id. We thus must give effect to the Policy’s “clear
and unambiguous” language. Id. (quoting 401 Fourth St., Inc. v. Inv’rs Ins. Grp., 879
A.2d 166, 170 (Pa. 2005)).

4

The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of a grant of summary judgment is
plenary. Nationwide Mut. Ins. v. CPB Int’l, Inc., 562 F.3d 591, 595 (3d Cir. 2009).
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine disputes of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). In reviewing a summary
judgment ruling, we consider the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49.
6

State substantive law governs which party bears the burden of proof in a diversity
case. Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1446 (3d Cir. 1996).
Pennsylvania law places the initial burden of establishing the existence of insurance
coverage on the insured. Nationwide Mut. Ins. v. Cosenza, 258 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir.
2001) (citing Erie Ins. Exch. v. Transamerica Ins., 533 A.2d 1363, 1366-67 (Pa. 1987)).
After the insured has met that burden, the burden shifts to the insurer to prove the
applicability of an exclusion in the insurance policy. Erie Ins. Exch., 533 A.2d at 136667. If the insurer demonstrates that an exclusion applies, the burden shifts back to the
insured to prove an exception to the exclusion, such that the damages claimed are
covered notwithstanding the exclusion. TIG Specialty Ins. v. Koken, 855 A.2d 900, 915
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004).
It is undisputed that the Jugans met their burden of establishing that the loss they
suffered falls within the Policy’s affirmative grant of coverage – specifically, Coverage
A. Furthermore, we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that MetLife met its
burden of proving the applicability of the Policy’s Absolute Freezing Exclusion.
MetLife’s expert concluded that insufficient heat in the Jugans’ home caused water in the
supply line to the dishwasher to freeze, which caused the dishwasher solenoid valve to
fracture. The expert stated that, when the water supply line thawed, hot water was
constantly supplied to the dishwasher and then leaked through the cracked valve, causing
the fuel oil tanks powering the home’s boiler to run dry. The Jugans did not provide any
evidence to rebut that expert’s determination that the water leakage was due to freezing.
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Thus, we must consider whether the Jugans met their burden of demonstrating an
exception to the Absolute Freezing Exclusion.
The exception at issue here hinges on whether the Jugans used reasonable care to
maintain heat in their home.5 They argue that the District Court erred in concluding that
they did not meet their burden of showing reasonable care, and they give five reasons:
first, there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that they used reasonable care to
maintain heat in the home; second, the Court improperly excluded facts alleged in
Mr. Jugan’s affidavit after misapplying the sham affidavit doctrine; third, reasonable care
is a fact-intensive question reserved solely for resolution by a jury; fourth, the Court
failed to account for Mr. Jugan’s disability; and, finally, the District Court failed to
consider the Jugans’ expectation of coverage. Those arguments are ultimately
unpersuasive.
First, the Jugans have not pointed to evidence showing that they used reasonable
care to maintain heat in their home. They argue that, because Mr. Jugan testified that he
only asked his neighbors to check on the home if he thought he had forgotten to do
something, the District Court erred by relying on Mr. Jugan’s testimony that his
neighbors had access to the home, had previously been asked to check on the home at
other times, and were never asked to check on the home before the loss that occurred
here. But establishing a reason for failing to ask a neighbor to check on the home is not
in itself evidence of reasonable care. It is also irrelevant that the Jugans had previously
The Jugans do not dispute the District Court’s conclusion that the Absolute
Freezing Exclusion’s only other exception, that the insured “shut off the water supply and
drained the plumbing and appliance of water[,]” is inapplicable in this case. (J.A. at 60.)
5
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left the basement heat at its lowest setting while the outside temperature was similar to
the frigid temperatures experienced in February 2015 without water freezing within the
home. The Jugans cannot establish reasonable care now by showing that similarly risky
actions in the past did not lead to any harm. Moreover, we agree with the District Court
that “a reasonable homeowner would have wanted to check to make sure that the
radiators worked before he went away in the winter[,] even if that homeowner, like
Mr. Jugan, had never experienced any problems in past.” (J.A. at 20-21.) It does not
matter that the Jugans had a thermometer in the basement generally observed over two
decades to stay at 54°F and that the basement heat was almost always set at its low
setting of 40°F, because other evidence suggests Mr. Jugan never tested the basement
radiators after they were shut off for repairs the previous summer. That was a material
change that rendered reliance on past experience unreasonable. In fact, Mr. Jugan
testified that there was no way to know whether the radiators worked at all while he was
absent from the home in early 2015. The fact that the thermostat on the main level was
on when Mr. Jugan left his home on February 1, 2015, is also not probative of reasonable
care to maintain heat, because it does not rebut the expert’s conclusion that pipes in the
basement froze because the thermostats were set too low, which ultimately caused the
boiler to fail when the fuel oil tank ran dry. Thus, we agree with the District Court’s
conclusion that the Jugans did not point to evidence creating a genuine dispute of
material fact that they had used reasonable care under the circumstances.
Second, the District Court did not misapply the sham affidavit doctrine when it
struck several averments from Mr. Jugan’s affidavit. The sham affidavit doctrine
9

provides that “[w]hen a nonmovant’s affidavit contradicts earlier deposition testimony
without a satisfactory or plausible explanation, a district court may disregard it at
summary judgment in deciding if a genuine, material factual dispute exists.” Daubert v.
NRA Grp., LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 391 (3d Cir. 2017). Averments that are “entirely
unsupported by the record and directly contrary to … testimony,” or that are “offered
‘solely’ to defeat summary judgment,” may be disregarded. Id. (quoting Jiminez v. All
Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 253-54 (3d Cir. 2007)). The District Court properly
applied those principles to strike Mr. Jugan’s averment that, “[w]hen Joseph Jugan
traveled away from his home during the winter of 2014-2015[,] he set the thermostat on
the main level of his house at 62 degrees Fahrenheit and … set the thermostat in the
basement at its low setting.” (J.A. at 353.) That definitive averment directly contradicts,
without explanation, Mr. Jugan’s earlier deposition testimony that he could not say
whether the main level thermostat was set to 62°F and that he does not remember the
temperature at which the basement thermostat was set at the time of the loss. The Jugans
were not free to defeat summary judgment by making last-ditch averments directly
contrary to the established record.
Third, whether the Jugans exercised reasonable care to maintain heat in their home
is not a question solely for resolution by a jury. Although the issue of reasonable care
very often demands a fact-intensive inquiry, summary judgment remains appropriate to
dispose of that issue when there is no genuine dispute of material fact. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) (providing that “summary judgment may
be granted” when the evidence supporting the nonmovant “is merely colorable or is not
10

significantly probative” (citation omitted)). The Jugans cite several cases for the
proposition that a jury must decide whether a person exercised reasonable care, but even
those cases indicate that a court should withhold that question from the jury “where the
facts are such that all reasonable men must draw the same conclusion from them[.]”
Grand Trunk Ry. Co. of Can. v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 417 (1892); see also Bailey v. Cent.
Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 353-54 (1943) (indicating that negligence, which involves a
question of reasonable care, is an issue appropriately decided by the jury where that issue
is of “debatable quality” and “fair-minded men might reach different conclusions”);
Taylor v. President, etc., of Del. & H. Canal Co., 8 A. 43, 45 (Pa. 1886) (stating only that
whether reasonable care was exercised is “ordinarily” a question for the jury “under all
the evidence”). Here, the District Court properly decided the question of reasonable care
at summary judgment because there is insufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury
could find that the Jugans exercised reasonable care to maintain heat in their home, given
the unrebutted expert testimony and Mr. Jugan’s admissions during discovery.
Fourth, the Jugans argument that the District Court erred by not accounting for
Mr. Jugan’s disability in the reasonable care analysis does not help their case. The
Jugans cite to Smith v. Sneller, 26 A.2d 452 (Pa. 1942), for the proposition that “the
standard of reasonable care under Pennsylvania law takes into account [a person’s]
‘infirmity’ or disability.” (Opening Br. at 18.) But Smith indicates that a person with a
disability would exercise “a higher degree of caution than a normal person” to
compensate for his disability. Smith, 26 A.2d at 453-54.
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Finally, we are unpersuaded by the Jugans’ contention that the District Court erred
when it failed to take into account their reasonable expectations under the contract.
Pennsylvania law provides that, regardless of whether an insurance contract is
ambiguous, the court should consider “the reasonable expectation of the insured” when
construing that contract. Betz v. Erie Ins. Exch., 957 A.2d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2008). The District Court recognized that principle of insurance contract interpretation in
its well-reasoned decision.6 But the Jugans have pointed to no evidence that would
establish a reasonable expectation of coverage under the Policy in the circumstances
demonstrated on this record.
III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor

of MetLife.

6

We note, however, that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has cast doubt upon
the breadth of that interpretive principle. See Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut.
Ins., 735 A.2d 100, 109 n.8 (Pa. 1999) (declining to decide whether to adopt the
contention “that the reasonable expectations of the insured must be considered, regardless
of the express terms of the policy,” which is a contention it described as “a substantial
expansion of the reasonable expectations doctrine, heretofore applied in very limited
circumstances”).
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